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long-term survival of the collectivity. Intrasocietal tensions can, of course, take many
forms, and thus might both manifest themselves, and respond to control, in any number of ways. What distinguishes federalism from other methods of internal social tension control is the specific mechanism to which it resorts: the deliberate creation and
perpetual maintenance of partially autonomous subnational polities within a larger
polity that is national, and therefore in some meaningful sense unified.1
The dominant characteristic of federal systems is thus a plan of institutional design
that channels the most serious anticipated intrasocietal tensions into the mold of
national-subnational conflict. Once contained within that arena, conflicts are then
managed in federal systems through maintenance of a careful—and sometimes surprisingly flexible and responsive—balance between the powers, competencies, and ultimately the political salience of national and subnational institutions of self-governance.
Most constitutional systems seek to establish their own permanence by creating firm and
static ground rules in a unique constitutional founding.2 Federal systems, in contrast,
attempt to secure their own permanence by establishing a system of intergovernmental
contestation that produces a perpetually moving yet dynamically stable equipoise.3
Although the precise tools available to governments for engaging each other in
these intergovernmental tests of strength can vary considerably depending upon the
details of the relevant constitutional order,4 they generally fall into one of two related
categories: exercising power and claiming power. The idea that national and subnational governments struggle against one another by deploying powers they indisputably command is perhaps most familiar in the “mutual checking” theory of federalism
propounded by James Madison. In Madison’s account, the dispersion of power among
national and subnational governments protects liberty by preventing a potentially
catastrophic concentration of power at either level.5 National and subnational governments then exercise their powers to compete for popular allegiance,6 either affirmatively, by using their powers to achieve substantively good outcomes preferred by
their respective polities; or negatively, by deploying their powers against the other to
impede, thwart, or otherwise “check” its capacity to achieve outcomes that are substantively bad.7
1

2

3

4

5
6
7

William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance 11 (1964); Daniel J. Elazar, Introduction, in
Federal Systems of the World, at xv (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 2d ed. 1994).
This is certainly the governing premise of social contract theory. See, e.g., John Locke, The Second Treatise of
Government ¶ 220 (Thomas P. Pearson, ed. 1952 [1690]) (“When the government is dissolved, the people are at
liberty to provide for themselves by erecting a new legislative, differing from the other by the change of persons
or form, or both, as they shall find it most for their safety and good.”). On the importance of constitutional
foundings, see also The Federalist, No. 1 (Hamilton); Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 205 (1991).
Arthur Benz & Jörg Broschek, Federal Dynamics: Introduction, in Federal Dynamics: Continuity, Change, and
the Varieties of Federalism 1, 2, 7, 14 (Arthur Benz & Jörg Broschek eds., 2013).
We describe some of the tools available in two systems in James A. Gardner & Antoni Abat i Ninet,
Sustainable Decentralization: Power, Extraconstitutional Influence, and Subnational Symmetry in the United
States and Spain, 59 Am. J. Comp. L. 491 (2011).
The Federalist, Nos. 48–51 (Madison).
Id., No. 46 (Madison), No. 28 (Hamilton).
James A. Gardner, Interpreting State Constitutions ch. 3 (2005); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to
Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism after Garcia, Sup. Ct. Rev. 341, 380–395 [1985].
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The second strategy of contestation available to governments in federal states concerns not exercising power, but claiming it. Because federalism creates a system of
competition among governments by dividing power, governments have obvious incentives to struggle over the constitutional allocation of power. While all constitutional
systems tend to evolve in response to changes and pressures arising in their immediate
environment,8 “in a federal government the problem is even more acute because the
distribution of powers between states and nation gives rise to demands for shifts in the
allocation of functions from one government to the other.”9 In federal states, in other
words, the precise allocation of power between national and subnational governments is a source of constant contention and dispute, one that is, moreover, “particularly prone to entrepreneurial redefinition.”10 In these circumstances, the contest is
waged on a different playing field: any available constitutional flexibility “is . . . likely to
be exploited by some national or subnational actors who continuously seek to extend
their power by changing the rules of the game and the allocation of resources, thus
producing permanent instability.”11
Federalism, then, is a structure of governance that is likely to be in nearly
constant motion.12 Federalism expressly contemplates, and indeed invites, intergovernmental contestation not only within the established constitutional framework, but over the dimensions of the constitutional framework itself. The regular
and predictable outbreak of these kinds of conflicts thus reflects not a design
flaw but the existence of a healthy, well-functioning, and indeed organically alive
federal system.13
In prior work, we have concentrated on cataloguing and analyzing the wide array
of constitutional and extra-constitutional tools to which some subnational governments have at times resorted in order to influence and, when necessary, to thwart
and undermine exercises of national power that they view as inimical to national
or subnational interests and commitments. Such tactics include, for example, withholding requested cooperation, exerting political influence through party channels,
bringing pressure through popular political mobilization, appealing to supranational organizations, filing lawsuits, and even engaging in open and illegal defiance
of national authority.14 Here, in contrast, we focus on one particular subnational
tactic for contesting national authority: claims of distinctive identity or sovereignty
(“DIS claims”).

8
9
10

11

12
13
14

William S. Livingston, Federalism and Constitutional Change 11, 295–318 (1956).
Id. at 11–12.
Jörg Broschek, Conceptualizing and Theorizing Constitutional Change in Federal Systems: Insights from
Historical Institutionalism, 21 Regional & Fed. Stud. 539, 548 (2011).
César Colino, Constitutional Change without Constitutional Reform: Spanish Federalism and the Revision of
Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy, 39 Publius 262, 263 (2009).
Benz & Broschek, supra note 3, at 2.
Jenna Bednar, The Robust Federation: Principles of Design (2009).
See Gardner & Abat, supra note 4, at 498–503, 507–512; Gardner, supra note 7, at 87–120. Regarding
such tactics in the US case, see also John D. Nugent, Safeguarding Federalism: How States Protect Their
Interests in National Policymaking (2009).
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DIS claims are claims by subnational units either to a distinctive subnational identity, whether ethnic, linguistic, cultural, or political, or to an enhanced measure of
sovereignty within the federation based on such distinctiveness. We view DIS claims as
predominantly instrumental, and thus typically asserted for the purpose of obtaining
some benefit. Most often, DIS claims are made in the course of jockeying for improved
position within the federation. The subnational unit may, for example, seek a more
generous allocation of constitutional competencies, or it may wish for greater deference from national actors toward exercises of subnational power, and believes that
recognition of its distinctiveness by other actors in the federal system will help produce the desired result. At the margins, DIS claims can be made to justify actual or
threatened secession—itself an important bargaining tool in federations15—or to take
up present positions that make the possibility of future secession more credible. But
regardless of whether they are asserted to back secession threats or merely to gain a
marginally improved position in routine intergovernmental contestation, DIS claims
are among the more aggressive tactics available to subnational units to get their way
in struggles with national governments.
As will be seen below, DIS claims are most often asserted initially in political
fora—for example, in intergovernmental ministerial negotiations or in national legislative committees—and addressed to national actors in the executive and legislative branches. Our main focus here, however, is what happens when DIS claims are
made or subjected to examination in judicial forums, in particular the national constitutional court. In these venues, they seem to receive a uniformly hostile reaction.
The aim of the article is to explain why DIS claims receive such negative treatment in
judicial forums, a result we attribute to the distinct institutional position of national
courts in federal systems.
The balance of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out our data, which
comprises a small but, so far as we have been able to determine, complete set of decisions by constitutional courts squarely addressing and fully analyzing in constitutional terms DIS claims made by subnational units. These rulings issue from the courts
of four federal or quasi-federal states—Spain, Italy, the United States, and Canada—
and one unitary state, France. The decisions offer a rich variety of circumstances for
judicial consideration. Some cases involve a negotiated political settlement in which
the national government recognizes and makes significant concessions in response
to subnational DIS claims (Spain, France). In others, subnational units unilaterally
assert DIS claims in processes that have been nationally approved (Italy), nationally
disapproved (United States), or are subjects of ongoing and inconclusive negotiation
(Canada).
Regardless of the circumstances, however, the national constitutional courts in our
sample reject subnational DIS claims. They draw no distinction between DIS claims
asserted in the context of actual or threatened secession and those asserted during routine jockeying for position in the course of intergovernmental contestation.
Nor do the courts distinguish between DIS claims made unilaterally by subnational
15

Bednar, supra note 13, at 77–85.
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governments and those agreed to by the national government in the course of negotiated intergovernmental political settlements. Instead, all such claims are rejected as a
matter of national constitutional law. Moreover, the judicial treatment of DIS claims
in the four federal states is no more accommodating or deferential than it is in the unitary state in our sample, suggesting that the presence of a federal structure matters
less to national judicial actors than it does to national executive and legislative actors.
Section 3 turns to analysis of the reasons for the different and hostile treatment of
DIS claims in constitutional courts. We argue that this result is best explained by the
distinct institutional position of national constitutional courts, and we explore four
aspects of the judiciary’s institutional role that might be relevant. First, constitutional
courts may be more likely to understand their role as enforcing the constitutional bargain than to understand it to include making the constitutional bargain work in practice. Second, unlike national executives and legislatures, which engage in constant
contestation with subnational units, constitutional courts are not repeat players in
these kinds of conflicts, and thus may lack a perspective that might encourage greater
tolerance of DIS claims as mere moves in an ongoing process of mutual competition.
Third, as organs of the national government, constitutional courts may not be quite
the impartial referees they appear to be when intervening in intergovernmental contests, and there are reasons to believe that they may sometimes have incentives not
only to favor the exercise of power at the national level, but to favor assertions of their
own power over conflicting assertions of national executive and legislative power.
Finally, national constitutional courts may be hostile to informal rearrangements
of the constitutional allocation of powers if they understand themselves to have a
special role to play in the protection of national minorities, especially those that in a
federation are weak on account of being geographically dispersed. National recognition of DIS claims often occurs in informal bilateral negotiations between national
and subnational officials, a process from which many constitutional stakeholders may
be excluded. National constitutional courts appear especially sensitive to this kind of
bilateralism. By rejecting informal settlements, and thereby insisting that constitutional changes be made exclusively in formal processes of constitutional amendment,
national constitutional courts may see themselves as discharging a distinct responsibility to ensure to all relevant stakeholders an appropriate place at the bargaining
table. This possibility in turn raises difficult questions of judicial choice concerning
which national minorities are entitled to the court’s solicitude.

2. Subnational DIS claims in national constitutional courts
Before examining the rulings of the constitutional courts, a preliminary word is in
order about the states represented in our sample. The pitfalls of case selection can be a
particularly acute problem in the comparative study of federalism. The number of federal states is small—perhaps a dozen or two, depending upon how one counts—and
they diverge widely along many relevant dimensions. A rigorous working definition
of federalism helps assure the similarity of states compared, but confines the breadth
and power of inferences because of the small size of both the sample and the universe
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by hypothesis deemed relevant. A more generous definition allows more powerful and
far-reaching inferences, but carries a risk of inaccuracy by sweeping in sample variation that the analysis may not take into account.
Here, we have opted for a more inclusive set of criteria.16 We think, however, that
the choice is well justified for two reasons. First, the objects we are comparing—a particularly narrow class of judicial rulings—are so few in number that the only way
to generate even a modest sample size is to take an inclusive approach. Second, as
will appear below, the reasonableness of this choice is, in our view, confirmed by the
remarkable similarity of the rulings and the analytic concepts invoked by the various
courts. Finally, as will be seen in Section 3, we compensate for the risks of an inclusive
comparison by practicing modesty in our inferences and conclusions. Thus, rather
than purporting to derive a definitive explanation of the phenomenon we describe, we
offer instead several possible, alternative accounts, and invite readers to use their own
judgment in assessing the plausibility of the alternatives we adduce.
We turn now to the rulings of the constitutional courts themselves. In each
instance, we attempt to contextualize the judicial rulings by providing background
information on the history of national-subnational conflict in the state at issue and
the events, if any, leading up to the particular conflict that ends up in court. This section accordingly discusses rulings by the constitutional courts of four federal or quasifederal states: Spain, Italy, the United States, and Canada. We set the stage, however,
perhaps paradoxically, with an intergovernmental dispute and subsequent judicial
ruling from a non-federal state—France.

2.1. France and Corsica
France is often held up as the exemplar of a modern unitary state.17 The French
Constitution opens by declaring France “an indivisible . . . Republic.”18 It provides
explicitly that “national sovereignty shall vest in the people”19—by which it means
the entire French people—and declares that “no section of the people may arrogate
16

17

18
19

In our sample, the United States and Canada are, by consensus, deemed indisputably federal. See, e.g.,
Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems 29–30, 32–33 (3d ed. 2008). Italy is generally thought of as
a non-federal state engaged in a process of regionalization that may in the end make it federal. Compare
id. at 25 (not listing Italy even among “quasi-federal” states or “emerging federations”) with Francesco
Palermo, Italy: A Federal Country without Federalism?, in Constitutional Dynamics in Federal Systems: Subnational Perspectives 237 (Michael Burgess & G. Alan Tarr, eds. 2012) (arguing that Italy has the institutions of federalism but not its politics). Whether Spain counts as federal is a question that has engaged
many scholars. For an overview, see, e.g., Gemma Sala, Federalism without Adjectives in Spain, 44 Publius
109 (2013). Making the problem even more complex is the fact that even core theoretical definitions of
federalism can change over time. See, e.g., Carl J. Friedrich, The Political Theory of Federalism, in Federalism
and Supreme Courts and the Integration of Legal Systems 34 (Edward McWhinney & Pierre Pescatore, eds.,
1973) (noting a “profound transformation” in the concept of federalism from one centered on competencies to one centered on “process”).
Norman Dorsen et al., Comparative Constitutionalism 429 (2d ed. 2010); Xavier Philippe, France: The
Amendment of the French Constitution “On the Decentralized Organization of the Republic,” 2 Int’l J. Const’l L.
691, 692 (2004).
Constitution of France (1958), art. I.
Id., art. 3.
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to itself . . . the exercise thereof,”20 thus excluding a federal form of organization.
Nevertheless, this constitutional declaration of national unity ignores a degree of
internal diversity that has on occasion erupted into calls for local recognition and
sovereignty.21
Corsica is a small island lying off the coasts of France and Italy that, after changing imperial masters many times over several centuries, was acquired permanently by
France in 1768, becoming a départment following the French Revolution.22 Along with
French and Italian, Corsican (curso), a language considered by UNESCO to be “potentially endangered,” is spoken on the island, and Corsicans appear to have plausible
grounds to claim some degree of cultural distinctiveness.23 In any event, a “growing
renewed awareness of a specifically Corsican identity . . . took a political turn in the
1960s with calls for greater self-determination.”24 The French government responded
to these demands with a series of measures, each devolving additional power and
autonomy to local Corsican governments.
In 1960, shortly following the birth of the Fifth Republic, Corsica was attached
for administrative purposes to the region of Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur, one of
twenty-one circonscriptions d’action régionale.25 This arrangement was altered
in 1972 when the circonscriptions were redenominated régions, and authorized
to adopt competencies, create regional councils, and exercise certain financial powers.26 In 1975, Corsica was detached from Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur
and became the twenty-second région, thus acquiring regional competencies
20
21

22
23

24

25

26

Id.
See, generally, John Bell, Devolution: French Style, 6 Eur. Pub. L. 139 (2000) (describing demands for devolution and self-governance relating to Polynesia and New Caledonia). French legal and political culture
has been an obstacle to the recognition of regional diversity and granting of local political autonomy.
Farimah Daftery, The Matignon Process and Insular Autonomy as a Response to Self-determination Claims,
2001(2) Eur. Ybk 302, 306 (2003). Due to the founding constitutional principles of the indivisibility
of the Republic and the equality of French citizen before the law, “France has been reluctant to develop
asymmetric solutions and to grant collective rights.” Id.
Grace L. Hudson, Corsica, at xxi–xxiii (1997).
On the status of the Corsican language, see UNESCO Red Book, available at http://www.helsinki.
fi/~tasalmin/europe_index.html; on Corsican culture, see Hudson, supra note 22, at xxvii–xxix. The use
of curso persisted well into the twentieth century, and French only became widely spoken in Corsica
after World War II. Kathleen Cunningham, Divided and Conquered: Why States and Self-determination
Groups Fail in Bargaining over Autonomy 92 (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, UC Sand Diego, 2007),
available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3rk9m7gk#page-122. Corsica’s distinctiveness has been
enhanced partly due to its physical separation from mainland France: id; Daftery, supra note 21, at 302;
Helen Hintjens, John Loughlin, & Claude Olivesi, The Status of Maritime and Insular France: The DOM-TOM
and Corsica, in The End of the French Unitary State? 121 (John Loughlin & Sonai Masey eds., 1995), and to
its economic insularity and lack of development. Daftery, supra note 21, at 302–303.
Hudson, supra note 22, at xxix. Post-war economic and social decline led some Corsicans to advocate radical solutions including autonomy within France or complete independence in the early 1970s. Hintjens
et al., supra note 23, at 121; Daftery, supra note 21, at 303; Cunningham, supra note 23, at 92–94. For a
concise account of Corsica’s identity claims in different eras, see Hintjens et al., supra note 23, at 121. For
more detail, see Daftery, supra note 21, at 303.
Decree No. 60 516 of June 2, 1960. The Region of Paris had a special organization regulated by Law No.
64–707 of July 10, 1964.
Law 72–619 of July 5, 1972.
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of its own. It was, however, divided into two départements, Haute-Corse and
Corse-du-sud.27
The pace of decentralization picked up significantly in 1982, when Corsica became
France’s only collectivité territoriale “de plein exercise,” a status not achieved by the rest of
the Regions for another four years, with its own organization, competences and specific
resources.28 The same law authorized the creation of the Corsican Assembly (Assemblée
de Corse)—a significant elevation of Corsica’s status among the Regions, the rest of
which were permitted only a Regional Council (conseil regional) rather than an assemblée.29 Although President Mitterand purported to support the change of terminology
as a mere linguistic concession,30 the word assemblée has important historical and symbolic resonance in France, and its use “reflected the fact that the Corsican Assembly
had greater competences than other régions . . . .”31 In addition, unlike the Regional
Councils, which were elected from départements on a constituency basis, election to the
Corsican Assembly was from a single Corsican constituency by means of proportional
representation,32 an innovation intended to “give [the Assembly] a greater feeling of
identity and unity.”33 Finally, the 1982 law created a unique pathway for Corsican
influence on national policy making. Under these procedures, the Corsican government was authorized to propose directly to the Prime Minister amendments to national
regulations and laws concerning cultural affairs, local development, and other areas
of express Corsican competence, to which the Prime Minister was obliged to respond.34
Despite these reforms, Corsican nationalist demands continued to intrude into
French politics, and in 1990 the Socialist government of François Mitterand took
up the issue as part of a more comprehensive package of policies that promoted
27

28

29

30
31
32

33

34

The decision to opt for “bidepartmentalization” was made by the Corsican Government and ratified by the
Municipal Councils of Ajaccio and Bastia, the General Council, and the assemblies. This administrative
reform changed in some sense an 1811 Napoleonic Decree that unified the two previous entities, Golo
and Liamone, in a unique department. Corsica thus settled upon an arrangement that made it bidepartmental but a sole region. La documentation française, L’évolution institutionnelle de l’île, http://www.
ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/dossiers/corse/evolution-institutionnelle.shtml (last visited 12 May, 2016);
Conseil departementale de la Corse du Sud, Du département de la Corse au département de la Corse du
Sud, http://www.cg-corsedusud.fr/collectivite-departementale/son-histoire/.
Law No. 82–214 of March 2, 1982. This recognition of Corsica’s special character was later diluted
by a more general process of decentralization during 1982–1986, which extended similar measures
to the other regions. This “banalization” of the Corsican statute, “which was no longer very special”
coupled with “a certain withdrawal by the state and the erratic functioning of the regional institutions in
Corsica” led to demands for new reform of the Corsican statute. Hintjens et al., supra note 23, at 122; see
also Daftery, supra note 21, at 307.
See Law No. 82–214 of Mar. 2, 1982, “on the particular statute of the region of Corsica: administrative
organization.”
http://www.droitconstitutionnel.net/Corsestatut.htm.
Claudina Richards, Devolution in France: the Corsican Problem, 10 Eur. Pub. L. 481, 484 (2004).
Direction de l’Information Légale et Administrative, Découverte des institutions: Approfondissement, La Vie
Publique, www.vie-publique.fr/decouverte-institutions/institutions/approfondissements/
Richards, supra note 31, at 484. This arrangement was upheld by the Conseil constitutionnel [CC]
[Constitutional Court] Decision no. 82–138 DC, Feb. 25, 1982, which ruled that the creation of a category of administrative unit containing only a single member did not violate the constitutional principle
of the indivisibility of the French Republic.
Law no. 82–214 of Mar. 2, 1982, art. 27.
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decentralization of government authority generally, as well as harmonization of the
status of French territories and overseas possessions specifically.35 Under the leadership of Interior Secretary Pierre Joxe, the French government enacted a new statute in
1991 that gave Corsica a unique and novel status among French subnational units.36
The statut Joxe, inspired by French law relating to the territory of French Polynesia,37
created a new entity, the Corsican Territorial Collectivity. The statute required the
French Prime Minister to consult the Corsican Assembly on drafts of laws and decrees
containing provisions specific to Corsica. New competences granted by the statut Joxe
related to education, communication, cultural activities, the environment, and transportation. Under the 1991 law, these competences were to be exercised according to
a process by which the Assembly of Corsica developed a plan which would become
enforceable after a period of consultation with the State.
Most significant for present purposes, however, is the opening section of the 1991
statute. That section adopted a tactic that earlier devolutionary provisions had not—
it made an express DIS claim. In highly sensitive and closely scrutinized language,
Article 1 declared in explicit terms:
The French Republic guarantees to the historical and culturally living community which constitutes the Corsican people, part of the French people, the rights to preserve its cultural identity and to defend its specific economic and social interests. These rights of insularity are to be
exercised with respect for national unity, within the constitutional framework, the laws of the
Republic, and the present statute.38

Earlier laws creating asymmetrical advantages for Corsica may of course very well
have been enacted in response to Corsican claims, asserted in political forums and
addressed primarily to the French parliament and executive, of historical, cultural,
and linguistic distinctiveness. The 1991 statute went further, however, by writing
such sentiments into national law.39
In a decision issued in May 1991, the French Conseil constitutionnel invalidated
this provision on constitutional grounds.40 Although the court had previously
35
36
37
38

Richards, supra note 31, at 488.
Law no. 91–428 of May 13, 1991.
Law no. 84–240 of Sept. 6, 1984.
Law no. 91–428 of May 13, 1991, art. 1:
La République française garantit à la communauté historique culturelle vivante que constituait le peuple
corse, composante du peuple français, les droits à la préservation de son identité culturelle et à la défense
de ses intérêts économiques et sociaux spécifiques. Ces droits, liés à l’insularité, s’exercent dans le respect
de l’unité nationale, dans le cadre de la Constitution, des lois de la République et du présent statut.

39

40

Note that the phrase “droits, liés à l’insularité” is translated on the website of the Conseil constitutionnel
as “rights that flow from its island status.”
The expression peuple corse was included in the original version of the earlier 1982 statute, but was
replaced, after objection, with a compromise phrase recognizing “[t]he Corsican people, a component of the French people,” which was relocated from the bill’s text to a section on legislative purpose.
Cunningham, supra note 23, at 101.
The Conseil constitutionnel is a hybrid body that exercises a mix of administrative and judicial functions,
but serves as the functional equivalent of a constitutional court in the sense of exercising final judgment
about the constitutionality of laws. See Constitution of France, arts. 56–63.
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been willing to tolerate the devolution of at least some asymmetrical competencies to Corsica, this provision went too far. The court based its decision largely on
the principle of the indivisibility of the French people. The court read Article 1 to
establish the existence within the French people of a constituent part (a sort of
subdivision), the “Corsican people,” an act that contravened constitutional principles asserting the uniqueness of the French people, consecrating the indivisibility of the Republic, and identifying the French people as a whole as the bearers of
national sovereignty.41 Where the expression “the people” applies to the French
people, the court held, it must be considered a unitary category incapable of subdivision by law.
The court also emphasized the constitutional obligation of France, as an indivisible,
secular, democratic, and social republic, to ensure the equality of all citizens before the
law, without distinction of origin. The law’s characterization of the “Corsican people”
as a “part of the French people,” the court held, violated this principle, which recognizes only the French people, composed of all French citizens without distinction of
origin, race, or religion. In the court’s view, to define Corsicans as a “people” in their
own right effectuated a kind of discrimination against the rest of the French people,42
who received no such additional recognition. In sum, the provision was seen as deeply
threatening to the coherence of the basic French constitutional arrangement, thereby
jeopardizing national unity.43

2.2. Spain and Catalonia
The origins of modern-day Spain lie in “the vagaries of dynastic politics and demographic reality.”44 From 1492 until 1712, Spain consisted of numerous political
communities enjoying varying degrees of independence. After the War of Spanish
Succession, which concluded in 1714, the Crown of Catalonia and Aragon lost its
political and economic independence in favor of Castilla. The Basque Country, in contrast, because it supported the winning side, continued for a time to enjoy substantial
autonomy.45 Thus, the configuration of present-day Spain, the degree of autonomy
enjoyed from time to time by its constituent units, and the nature and amicability
41
42
43

44
45

Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] Decision no. 91–290 DC, May 9, 1991, ¶¶ 11–14.
“Une régime discriminatoire,” id., ¶ 22.
The court also invalidated some aspects of the statutory devolution of authority to Corsica. See id., ¶¶ 51,
55, 59. Following these events, negotiations between Paris and Corsica continued. In 1999, a summit
between the State government, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, and representatives of Corsica initiated the
“Matignon process,” culminating in a new statute granting Corsica various forms of autonomy. Daftery,
supra note 21. Several important provisions of this law were invalidated by the Conseil constitutionnel.
See CC, Decision No. 2001–454 DC, Jan. 17, 2002. In 2003, the National Assembly enacted a new decentralization law, Law No. 2003–276 of Mar. 28, 2003, but an attempt by the Corsican government to
invoke it was defeated in a referendum. See 2002: Des pouvoirs renforcés, Collectivité terriotoriale de Corse,
May 2, 2002, available at http://www.corse.fr/2002-des-pouvoirs-renforces_a394.html. In 2011, the
Corsican Assembly enacted a law providing a roadmap for making Corse an official language by 2014.
William D. Phillips, Jr. & Carla Rahn Phillips, A Concise History of Spain 82 (2010).
Simon Barton, A History of Spain 139 (2004).
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of relations among its various components all result to some extent from historical
contingencies relating to the military superiority of one nation over another and the
shifting fortunes of allies of various contestants in nationwide and European power
struggles.
Catalonia, a populous and prosperous province occupying Spain’s northeast corner,
has a long history as an intermittently independent nation, and indeed as an imperial
power in its own right. Its indigenous language is Catalan, a language suppressed for
decades by the Franco regime during the mid-twentieth century, and it claims a cultural patrimony distinct from that of Castillian Spain.46
The present Spanish Constitution dates to 1978, but some of its important institutions owe their origins to events surrounding adoption of the Constitution of
1931. The model of territorial organization, in particular, echoes understandings first reached between republican and leftist political parties in negotiations
conducted in San Sebastian in 1930 (los pactos de San Sebastián).47 During these
negotiations, the parties discussed both federal and regional models of territorial
organization for a future Spanish Republic. The final agreement declared the abolition of the Spanish monarchy, the establishment of public liberties, and confederation of the Iberian nationalities.48 Following a brief but contentious period of
misunderstandings and sometimes tense negotiations between representatives of
Madrid and Barcelona,49 a newly elected Catalan government joined the Spanish
Republic. Its authority was set out in a Statute of Autonomy, which was approved
by popular referendum in Catalonia and ratified by the future Spanish Constituent
Assembly.50
Shortly thereafter, in the summer of 1931, the parliament in Madrid adopted the
Constitution of the Second Spanish Republic, which declared Spain to be “an ‘integral’ State, compatible with the autonomy of the towns and regions,”51 a concept
that placed its territorial organization somewhere between unitary and federal,52 and
prefigured the arrangements adopted in the current Constitution of 1978. Following
46
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In its modern, self-conscious form, Catalan nationalism dates approximately to the beginning of the
twentieth century, where the deliberate cultivation of a distinct cultural identity became a project of
“Catalan intellectuals.” Catalonia: A European History 113 (Ramon Grau & Josep M. Muñoz eds., 2006).
Adolfo Hernández Lafuente, Autonomía e integración en la Segunda República 23 (1980).
Id. at 30. It is also important to remark that the most important leftist party in Spain in 1931, the Spanish
Party (PSOE), did not ratify the agreement.
In April of 1931, Francesc Macià, the Catalan leader, briefly proclaimed an independent Catalan
Republic. The Spanish provisional government in Madrid rejected this proclamation and sent emissaries
to Barcelona to urge the Catalan leadership to adhere to the agreements reached at San Sebastian. After
tense negotiations, the Catalan leadership agreed to join the new Spanish Republic. See Alfonso XIII, un
político en el trono (Javier Moreno Luzón ed., 2003); Hernández Lafuente, supra note 47, at 25.
See Comellas Jose Luis, Historia de España Moderna y Contemporanea (2003); Pio Mora, El derrumbe de la
Segunda República y la Guerra Civil (2001); Vergés Oriol & Cruañas Josep, The Generalitat in the History of
Catalonia, Dept. de Cultura de la Generalitat de Catalunya, University of Indiana, 2001.
Constitution of the Second Spanish Republic (1931), art. 1.
As will be seen below, this model was followed by the Italian Constitution of 1947 with its “regional”
organization. See Juan Ferrando Badía, Teoría y Realidad del Estado Autonómico, 3 Rata de Revista de Política
Comparada III, 38 (1980–1981); see also Cesar Aguado Renedo, Los estatutos de autonomia en Italia (1998).
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adoption of the 1931 constitution, the Spanish Parliament approved a new Statute of
Autonomy for Catalonia—one more limited in scope than Catalonia had sought53—
that defined Catalonia as an autonomous region within the Spanish State.54
The successful evolution of a Spanish democratic state was disrupted at this point
by several events including a sudden unilateral declaration of Catalan secession in
1934 by President Lluis Companys,55 the Spanish Civil War,56 and the Franco dictatorship. When the process was resumed in 1975 after the fall of Franco, Spain’s 1978
Constitution carried forward the suspended effort to establish a modern state that gave
adequate recognition to the pluralism and diversity of its society. However, the new
context was different: because of fears in many quarters that the sudden easing of
decades of central repression might lead to a rapid disintegration of a refounded, democratic Spanish state, care was taken to assure strong central control of the process.
In consequence, the present Spanish Constitution begins with an emphatic statement of national identity. “National sovereignty,” it proclaims, “belongs to the
Spanish people, from whom all state powers emanate.”57 “The Constitution,” it goes
on, “is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation.”58 Despite this fundamental commitment to a national model, the Spanish Constitution contains elaborate
provisions authorizing a substantial degree of decentralization of power. Specifically,
the Spanish Constitution “recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government
of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed.”59 An entire chapter of the
Constitution makes good on this promise by recognizing the “right to self-government”
of Autonomous Communities (Communidades Autónomas).60 However, unlike constitutions of fully federal states, the Spanish Constitution does not guarantee the autonomy,
or even the existence, of any particular subnational region. Rather, the Constitution
delegates all decisions to recognize and empower Autonomous Communities to the
Spanish Parliament (Cortes Generales) as a matter of legislative discretion through a
process of central legislative approval of proposed subnational Statutes of Autonomy
(Estatutos de Autonomías),61 as well as any subsequent amendments to the Statutes.62
Catalonia’s first Statute of Autonomy, approved in 1979, was modest in its claims.
Article 1 of the Statute defined Catalonia as a “Nationality,” but this language was
designed to be consistent with Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution, which used
the same term for essentially the same purpose, and raised no concerns in Madrid.
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cat, Estatut de Catalunya del 1932, available at http://www.enciclopedia.cat/EC-GEC-0025216.xml.
A comparison between the text approved by the Catalan citizenship and public organizations and the
text passed by the Spanish Parliament is available at http://www.vilaweb.cat/media/attach/vwedts/docs/
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Companys (2007)
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Spanish Constitution, art. 1(2) (emphasis added). English translations of the Constitution are available at
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Id., art. 2.
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Sentiments of Catalan nationalism, however, increased over the ensuing decades,
and by the beginning of the new century political pressure in Catalonia to alter the
existing relationship with the Spanish state had grown too intense to resist. Catalan
governments began to speak openly of seeking greater subnational autonomy, and
there was even talk of secession. Under the Spanish Constitution, however, approval
of the Spanish Parliament was necessary to amend the Catalan Statute of Autonomy,
and central Spanish governments, often controlled by the conservative Partido Popular,
were resistant to any sign of resurgent Catalan nationalism.
In the mid-2000s, however, changes of partisan control at both levels presented an
opportunity. The major Catalan nationalist party, Convergència i Unió, assumed control
of the Catalan Parliament (Generalitat) on a platform committed to seeking changes
in the existing relationship with Spain. In 2004, the left-leaning Spanish Socialist
Workers’ Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, or PSOE) assumed control in Madrid
with the support of Catalan deputies. This change in the political landscape created
an opening for an agreement amending the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, an opportunity that the Catalan government immediately seized.
In 2005, Catalonia proposed a new Statute of Autonomy that aggressively asserted
an integrated set of very strong and interactive DIS claims. The Preamble provided
that “Catalonia’s self-government is founded on the Constitution, and also on the historical rights of the Catalan people, which, in the framework of the Constitution, give
rise to recognition in this Statute of the unique position of the Catalan Government.”
It claimed that “Catalonia [is] a nation”; that Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution
“recognizes the national reality of Catalonia as a nationality”; and that the new
Statute of Autonomy fulfills “the inalienable right of Catalonia to self-government.”63
Article 1 of the Statute provides that “Catalonia, as a nation, exercises its self-government by constituting itself as an Autonomous Community.”64 Article 3 declares
that “The relations between the Generalitat and the State are founded on the principle
of mutual institutional loyalty and are governed by . . . the principle of autonomy, that
of bilateralism and also that of multilateralism.”65 It goes on to state that “Catalonia
has its geographical and political space of reference in the State and the European
Union and incorporates the values, principles and obligations that derive from the fact
of being part of them.”66 Article 5 asserts that Catalan “self-government . . . is also
founded on the historic rights of the Catalan people.”67 These are clearly provocative
assertions.
The Statute goes on at considerable length in this manner. It provides that “Spanish citizens” resident in Catalonia “enjoy the political status . . . of Catalan citizens.”68 It names
the Catalan flag as a “national symbol,”69 and creates a right of “citizens of Catalonia”
63
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Organic Law No. 6/2006 of July 19, 2006, Preamble [hereinafter Catalan Statute of Autonomy 2006].
Id., art. 1.
Id., art. 3(1).
Id., art. 3(2).
Id., art. 5.
Id., art. 7(1).
Id., art 8(1).
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to use Catalan in all interactions with public authorities,70 an obligation it purports to
apply to all judges and judicial officers “who occupy a post in Catalonia,”71 presumably
including national judges. It creates a “Council of Justice of Catalonia,” which it deems
“the governing body of the judicial power in Catalonia,”72 an apparent attempt either
to establish an independent provincial judiciary or to assert Catalan control over the
existing national judiciary, rearrangements that would challenge the regime created by
the Spanish Constitution, which establishes a unified judiciary under central control.73
Another provision declares that in areas marked by the Spanish Constitution for shared
national and subnational power, ultimate authority to interpret the scope of subnational
authority lies with the Catalan legislature and executive, relegating the national government and the Spanish Constitutional Court to establishing only basic or minimal rules.74
The proposed Statute, in short, offered a considerably different vision of the status
of Catalonia within Spain than the 1979 Statute of Autonomy, one that at a minimum
proceeded to the very outermost limits of subnational autonomy authorized by the
Spanish Constitution. In fact, though, a better reading of the new Statute, particularly
in light of the historical and political background of its enactment, is that it rather
straightforwardly attempted to extend the scope of Catalan subnational autonomy
beyond limits contemplated by the 1978 Spanish Constitution. Yet notwithstanding
the ambitious scope of the proposed alterations, the Zapatero government in Madrid
approved the changes, and in 2006 Parliament passed a law bringing them into effect.
Almost immediately, a politically fraught lawsuit was brought in the Spanish
Constitutional Court challenging the constitutionality of the new Statute.75 In a decision that took four years to produce, the Court decisively rejected all the most significant portions of the Statute.76 Its strategy, however, was odd. Rather than take the
Statute for what it transparently was—a rewriting of the constitutional relationship
between national and subnational power, approved by the central government following bilateral negotiations with Catalonia—the Court chose instead to take the view
that the Statute was the complete opposite: a well-intentioned and altogether minor
alteration to prevailing norms and practices that suffered from clumsy drafting. Thus,
the Court chose repeatedly to rely on a rule of interpretation under which it construed
language in the Statute, no matter how significant and challenging to the existing
constitutional order, in a way that rendered it consistent with existing constitutional
principles. A “maximalist conception,” the Court said early in its ruling, “must always
be opposed.”77
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Id., art. 33.
Id., art. 102.
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The Court’s approach is evident from the beginning. Constitutional challenges to
strong language in the preamble were rejected on the ground that preambles have no
binding legal effect.78 Similarly, the Court sustained Article 5, which declared “the selfgovernment of Catalonia” to be “based on the historical rights of the Catalan People.”
This provision, the Court said, “would be clearly unconstitutional if it attempted to
gain for the Statute of Autonomy a foundation outside the Constitution.”79 Although
the deeply nationalist context in which the Statute was drafted suggests precisely that
meaning, the Court went on instead to hold that “the entire language of the provision allows that interpretation to be ruled out.” The phrase “historical rights,” the
Court said, must refer only to “rights and traditions of private law” or perhaps to forms
of public law uncontroversially within the control of Autonomous Communities
under the Spanish Constitution.80 To understand the rights in question as “legally a
foundation for the self-government of Catalonia” would thus be to understand them
“incorrectly.”81 Similarly, provisions of the Statute elevating the status of the Catalan
language were interpreted away as merely offering “a linguistic option.”82
The opinion goes on in this vein for another 137 paragraphs, interpreting contextually significant language to have no significance, and very occasionally invalidating a provision of the Statute when it is susceptible to no saving interpretation. As
Giacomo Delledonne aptly observes, the Court’s approach is that “any norms which
may appear a legal contribution to the building up of a Catalan nation, if they cannot be interpreted consistently with the Constitution, are illegitimate or without legal
value.”83 While the Court’s hostility to Catalonia’s DIS claim—and its official recognition by Spain—is thus covered by a thin veneer of polite condescension, it is hostility
nonetheless.84

2.3. Italy and Sardinia
Modern Italy was created between about 1860 and 1870 by the military unification
of the various cities, duchies, and kingdoms that for centuries had occupied the peninsula.85 Its establishment has thus from the beginning required a deliberate program
of nation-building designed to impose central control over a diverse and sometimes
unruly collection of communities with long histories of political, cultural, and linguistic independence. As Massimo d’Azeglio, a writer and politician of the Italian founding period, summed up the dilemma of Italy’s creators, “Having made Italy, we must
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Giacomo Delledonne, Speaking in the Name of the Constituent Power: The Spanish Constitutional Court and the
New Catalan Estatut, 3 Perspectives on Federalism 1, 9 (2011).
Interestingly, provisions similar to those invalidated in the Catalan Statute of Autonomy had not previously been thought to present constitutional problems in the Statutes of Autonomy of other Autonomous
Communities. See Gardner & Abat, supra note 4, at 519.
Lucy Riall, Risorgimento: The History of Italy from Napoleon to Nation State 32–36 (2009).
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now make Italians.”86 Italy’s contemporary history has accordingly been one of periodic struggle to establish a satisfactory and sustainable balance between national and
subnational loyalties and institutions of governance.
For many decades, Italy’s leaders focused their attention primarily on the task of
establishing effective central control, deliberately appropriating aspects of the French
model of “centralized and bureaucratic administration.”87 Following the Second
World War and the collapse of the highly centralized Fascist regime, however, Italy
chose a different path. The 1948 Constitution, still in force today, “represented a compromise between the centralized State, which had existed in Italy since unification,
and a looser federal State.”88 The Italian Constitution thus opens with a declaration
that “Sovereignty belongs to the [whole] people and is exercised by the [whole] people
in the forms and within the limits of the Constitution,”89 a provision gesturing toward
a central form of organization. At the same time, however, it provides that Italy “is
composed of Municipalities, Provinces, Metropolitan Cities, Regions and the State,”
and describes these subnational units as “autonomous entities having their own statutes, powers and functions,”90 a provision establishing some significant degree of
decentralized regionalism.
This regionalization, moreover, is asymmetrical: five regions of Italy are expressly
granted “special forms and conditions of autonomy.”91 Pursuant to this grant, the
“special” regions are authorized to adopt statutes of autonomy which, like their
Spanish counterparts, must be approved by both the regional parliament and by the
national Parliament as a “constitutional law.”92 Adoption of such a statute authorizes
the special region to assume various powers of local self-governance that would otherwise be exercised by the central government.
One of these “special” regions is Sardinia, a large island of about two million inhabitants lying off the west coast of Italy and the south coast of Corsica, from which it
is separated by only a few miles of open water. Although it has been “traditionally
isolated from the mainland,”93 Sardinia, like much of modern Italy, has been a site
of frequent political conflict, having been at various times occupied by, incorporated
into, or allied with Rome, the Vandals, Byzantium, Arab states, Genoa, Pisa, Spain, the
Holy Roman Empire, Savoy, Piedmont, and of course Italy.94 In spite of this constant
ferment in its political identity, or perhaps because of it, the residents of Sardinia have
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retained a distinctive culture95 and among them speak several languages now considered by UNESCO to be endangered.96
Sardinian nationalism has waxed and waned over the last century. A burst of such
nationalism was responsible for Sardinia’s designation as a special region in the 1948
Constitution.97 Temporarily satisfied by this concession, Sardinians gravitated away
from the Sardinian Party of Action (Partito Sardo d’Azione), Sardinia’s main nationalist party, but nationalist sentiments enjoyed a resurgence during the 1960s.98 By
the 1970s, repackaged in cultural and anti-colonial terms, Sardinian nationalism
embraced not only continuing and increased support for federal-style devolution and
regional autonomy but also at times support for outright independence.99
Nationalist sentiment sputtered again in the late 1970s and 1980s due to a combination of Sardinia’s economic dependence on Rome and popular disillusionment with the
nationalist parties,100 but it reignited following national constitutional reforms in 1991
and 2001. These reforms implemented a long-term plan of Italian “federalization” that
narrowed the differences between the “special” and “ordinary” regions by authorizing the
latter to assume a range of competencies closer to those previously allowed only to the
special regions.101 These changes “precipitated something of a crisis of identity in the five
‘special regions,’ who [sic] were stripped of their specialità . . . . In response, all parties in
Sardinia . . . began advocating Sardinian ‘sovereignty’ and the rights of the Sard people.”102
These sentiments eventually found formal legal expression in a new Statute of
Autonomy adopted in 2006 by the Sardinian regional parliament.103 Drafted by a provocatively named “commission for drafting the new statute on autonomy and sovereignty of the Sardinian people,”104 the statute began by declaring the “autonomy
and sovereignty of the Sardinian People”;105 went on to describe “principles and characters of regional identity founded on autonomy and sovereignty”;106 and proceeded
95
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to offer “other relevant arguments to define autonomy and the elements of regional
sovereignty.”107 Like its Catalan counterpart, the Sardinian Statuto “insinuated,” as
Palermo observes, “that Sardinians wanted to exercise their self-determination internally and thus enjoy (special) autonomy within the Italian state.”108 Notwithstanding
the Italian government’s official policy of encouraging the regioni to assume additional powers and responsibilities, Sardinia’s proposed law was immediately challenged by the government in the Italian Constitutional Court (ICC) on the ground that
it exceeded constitutionally permissible limits of subnational autonomy.
The ICC agreed.109 As in the French statute relating to Corsica discussed earlier, the
key defects in Sardinia’s Statuto were its overreaching DIS claims, and in particular its
references to Sardinian “sovereignty” and a “Sardinian people.” The Constitution, the
Court said, “refers to regions ‘mentioning always and only autonomy and never sovereignty.’”110 The Constitution’s uses of the term “people,” moreover, refer exclusively to
“the entire national community,”111 not to communities resident within subnational
units of the state. Furthermore, implicit in the constitutional creation and empowerment of regions is an underlying “principle of uniqueness and indivisibility of the
Republic.”112 Sovereignty, by this principle, “must refer to the entire, and for this reason
inseparable, national community.”113 Claims to constitutionally relevant distinctiveness or sovereignty, the Court continued, cannot rest on “ethnic, cultural, and environmental elements,” for doing so would “define subjective and privileged situations
for a category of subjects of the national set of rules.”114
Finally, the Court said, the challenged provisions of the Sardinian Statuto express “a
conception of the relationship between State and Region which is totally different from
the regionalism envisioned by our constitutional system.”115 Instead, those provisions
“connote, by their nature, extension, and quantity, a regional structure more from the
point of view of federalism than from the point of view of regional autonomy.”116 Yet
the Italian Constitution from its inception “excluded absolutely conceptions that could
be even remotely ascribable to federal or confederal models.”117 Thus, the Court intimated, Sardinia’s DIS claim, made in its new Statuto, represented an illicit, unilateral
attempt to amend the national constitution outside of formally specified processes.118
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2.4. The United States and Texas
The United States is usually perceived to be culturally and linguistically homogeneous
by global standards. This is not because the American populace lacks internal diversity; a long history of immigration (voluntary and otherwise) has in fact endowed the
US with a fairly impressive ethnocultural pluralism. The impression of homogeneity
arises instead from the fact that American diversity does not for the most part track
political boundaries. In the United States, distinct cultural, linguistic, and religious
groups tend to be geographically dispersed, and even where they are concentrated,
as in urban areas, they tend not to comprise majorities capable of exercising political
control at the regional level. That dispersion, combined with a longstanding national
project of assimilation, has tended to undermine the conditions necessary for ethnocultural distinctiveness to evolve into the kind of substate nationalism sometimes
encountered elsewhere. As a result, American states today rarely assert any kind
of distinct identity or sovereignty. On the few occasions when states do make such
claims, they tend to be asserted either in circumstances where acceptance or rejection
of the claim is incapable of issuing in legal consequences,119 or in which any legal
consequences are confined to institutions wholly within the state’s control, such as
the meaning of subnational constitutions.120
There is, however, one important episode in American history during which some
states did make highly significant DIS claims—the Civil War. Indeed, these claims were
the most serious kind that subnational units in a federal state are capable of asserting,
for they were deployed to justify actual secession from the federation. Acts of secession
generally require justification. During the period preceding the US Civil War, and for
some time even well after the war’s conclusion, Southern states sometimes justified
secession on the basis of a distinctive Southern cultural identity,121 which was said
to be characterized variously by ethnic homogeneity,122 an agrarian way of life,123 an
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honor-based culture,124 or a cultural predisposition to violence.125 Historians tend to
view these claims with skepticism; Kenneth Stampp, for example, argues bluntly that
“the notion of a distinct southern culture was largely a figment of the romantic imaginations of a handful of intellectuals and proslavery propagandists.”126 Nevertheless,
even if Southern assertions of cultural distinctiveness may in the end be unpersuasive,
there is no doubt that the seceding Southern states made very real and serious claims
of political distinctiveness. Invoking the principles of the American Revolution, they
claimed a natural right to dissolve existing political arrangements, form a new civil
society, and reestablish self-government in a form more to their liking.127
The American Civil War was of course resolved through military and political
rather than judicial intervention. Still, on one occasion shortly after the War’s conclusion the US Supreme Court was called upon to evaluate Southern DIS claims against
national constitutional standards. In Texas v. White,128 the Court decisively rejected the
legitimacy of those claims.
It is often the case in American jurisprudence that weighty and complex constitutional issues arise for decision in disputes involving unrelated and even trivial issues.
So it was here. In 1850, the State of Texas, then part of the Union, had settled certain
financial claims against the US government by accepting federal bonds, redeemable in
1865. Following its secession in 1861, the Texas government transferred the bonds
to private entrepreneurs as payment for wartime supplies. When the war concluded,
a new, pro-Union government sought return of the bonds on the ground that their
transfer by the temporary Confederate government had been illegal. To vindicate
this claim, Texas brought suit directly in the US Supreme Court under a provision of
Article III of the US Constitution granting the Court jurisdiction over cases “in which
a state shall be party.”129 The fate of the bonds is unimportant. What mattered was
whether a state that had seceded and been militarily conquered could be considered a
“state” for purposes of the Supreme Court’s Article III jurisdiction.
In a wide-ranging decision, the Court held that Texas was a “state” within the meaning of Article III and emphatically rejected any suggestion that Texas might at any time
have acquired a political identity other than its identity as a member state of the Union.
The Court’s principal strategy was to draw a distinction between a political community
and a government. A “state,” the Court held, is properly understood as “a people or community,” and it is the “people” rather than the government that comprises the state.130
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Eaton, supra note 121, at 297, 298.
Frank E. Vandiver, The Southerner as Extremist, in the Idea of the South: Pursuit of a Central Theme 43
(1964).
Kenneth M. Stampp, The Imperiled Union: Essays on the Background of the Civil War 256 (1980).
See, e.g., Confederate States of America Constitution (1861), Preamble:
We, the people of the Confederate States, each State acting in its sovereign and independent character, in
order to form a permanent federal government, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, and secure
the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity invoking the favor and guidance of Almighty God
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the Confederate States of America.
74 U.S. 700 (1868).
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
74 U.S. at 720.
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On this view, the Court ruled, the United States comprises “one people and one country.”131 The relationship among members of this demos, the Court said, is not “a purely
artificial and arbitrary relation”132—is not, in other words, a matter purely of rational
choice. In fact, the relationship is organic, having grown “out of common origin, mutual
sympathies, kindred principles, similar interests, and geographical relations.”133 The
Court’s foundational premise thus denied outright the possibility of meaningful cultural
differentiation.
Moreover, the Court continued, the Union itself was perpetual—it was “an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.”134 Admission of Texas to the
Union marked “the incorporation of a new member into the political body,” and this
incorporation “was final.”135 The state’s declaration of secession was thus “null,” and
“the State did not cease to be a State, nor her citizens to be citizens of the Union.”136
Even popular ratification in Texas of its secession ordinance did not and could not alter
this relationship, which was at most “suspended.”137
It is true, the Court said, that during this period “Texas was controlled by a government hostile to the United States.”138 Nevertheless, the Court’s analysis intimates, the
proper way to understand the period of secession and rebellion is not that Texans had
grown apart from other Americans, or that they had either acquired or deliberately
chosen a distinct political identity, but that the political community of Americans
living in Texas had essentially been taken over by a rogue and in some sense alien
government. Following military action by the United States against that government, Texans consequently “retain their identity” as members of the American body
politic.139
The US Supreme Court’s analysis thus denies utterly at every step the validity and basic assumptions of Southern DIS claims made before and during the
Civil War. There was no distinctive subnational identity, either culturally or politically. Since there was no distinctive identity, there could be no legitimate claim
to self-sovereignty, and secession was therefore void, even when measured by the
principles of just revolution shared by all Americans. Instead, secession resulted
from the hostile occupation of Texas by a rogue and alien government—it was,
as Justice Grier observed mockingly in dissent, an episode of collective “insanity,
and [Texas now] asks the court to treat all her acts made during the disease as
void.”140 It is hard to imagine a more hostile judicial reaction to a subnational
DIS claim.
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Id. at 721.
Id. at 724–725.
Id. at 725.
Id.
Id. at 726.
Id.
Id. at 727.
Id.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 740 (Grier, J., dissenting).
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2.5. Canada and Quebec
By an accident of colonial conquest, Canada has since its founding contained two very
large and distinct settler communities: a linguistically and culturally British majority, and
a linguistically and culturally French minority.141 Although members of the latter group
can be found to some extent throughout Canada, they are for the most part geographically
concentrated in the province of Quebec, where they comprise a significant majority.142 As
a result, whereas English is by far the dominant language in most of Canada, Quebec’s
primary language is French. Similarly, Quebec retains a civil law code and institutions
inherited in great part from France, whereas English Canada’s legal and institutional
inheritance derives from English common law and customary institutions.143
Although relations between French and English Canada have never been troublefree,144 things took a marked turn for the worse in the 1980s following consolidation
of Quebec’s “Quiet Revolution,” during which its populace came to a kind of enhanced
self-consciousness as a distinct cultural and linguistic community.145 This self-awareness led Québécois to understand themselves to a much greater extent than before as a
frequently overwhelmed minority in Canadian national politics and policy, a situation
that in turn came to be perceived, with some degree of alarm, as constituting a threat
to the long-term survival of Quebec’s linguistic and cultural distinctiveness.146
In accordance with this new self-understanding, Quebec’s leadership made repeated
demands during the 1980s and 1990s for national constitutional changes that would
give Quebec an enhanced status among the Canadian provinces, changes that were
said to be necessary to furnish Quebec with tools adequate to preserve its language
and culture from majoritarian pressures. On two occasions Canadian leaders reached
agreements in principle that would have given Quebec at least some of what it wanted,
but the first deal was subverted by a sudden withdrawal of approval by some provincial leaders, and the second deal was scuttled by a failure of popular ratification.147
Frustrated by their inability to make significant headway in national political forums,
Quebec’s leaders—along with a sizable segment of the provincial public—began by
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Kenneth McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity 2–8 (1997).
Id. at 85.
Anglophone Canada is also predominantly Protestant, whereas Quebec is overwhelmingly Catholic. See
David Cameron, Quebec and the Canadian Federation, in Canadian Federalism: Performance, Effectiveness, and
Legitimacy 46 (Herman Bakvis & Grace Skogstad, eds., 3d ed. 2012), but the salience of these religious differences to questions of subnational distinctiveness and authority appears to have declined substantially
over the course of the late twentieth century.
See, e.g., McRoberts, supra note 141, at 2–29 (describing numerous conflicts from colonial times to the
mid-twentieth century).
Cameron, supra note 143, at 47–49; Alain C. Cairns, The Politics of Constitutional Renewal in Canada,
in Redesigning the State: The Politics of Constitutional Change, 95, 99–101 (Keith G. Banting & Richard
Simeon eds., 1985).
Roger Gibbins, Constitutional Politics, in Canadian Politics 97 (James Bickerton & Alain G. Gagnon, eds.,
5th ed. 2009); McRoberts, supra note 141, at 101.
Peter H. Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Be a Sovereign People? (1992); Gibbins, supra note
146, at 106–110; Sujit Choudhry, Beyond the Flight from Constitutional Legalism: Rethinking the Politics of
Social Policy Post-Charlottetown, 12(3) Forum Constitutionnel 77 (2003).
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the mid-1990s to talk seriously about, and even to make preparations for, secession
from Canada.148 In response, national leaders asked the Supreme Court of Canada
(SCC) for an advisory opinion on the question of whether Quebec could secede unilaterally from the federation.
In the Secession Reference,149 the SCC answered the question negatively. The court
had no difficulty acknowledging the validity of Quebec’s claims to cultural and linguistic distinctiveness. Canada’s federalism, the court observed, is itself a response to
political and cultural diversity;150 federalism “recognizes the diversity of the component parts of Confederation,” and “facilitates the pursuit of collective goals by cultural
and linguistic minorities which form the majority within a particular province.”151
While thus conceding implicitly that Quebeckers might have valid political reasons to think secession justifiable, the court emphatically rejected the contention that
Quebec could act unilaterally on such impulses. Although Canada is a democracy,
the court said, and democratic majorities may express themselves in a federation at
the national and provincial levels, the Canadian Constitution does not establish a system of “simple majority rule” at any level;152 the wishes of majorities may be acted
upon only consistent with broader principles of the rule of law and constitutional
supremacy.153
A unilateral attempt by a province to secede, the court ruled, would therefore
amount to a unilateral attempt by that province to amend the national constitution,
an unauthorized method of amendment.154 Secession by Quebec could in principle
be accomplished lawfully, but only if undertaken in accordance with the amendment procedures provided by the constitution. Those procedures, according to the
court, require ongoing discussion and the consideration of dissenting voices;155 they
require, in short, negotiation among all constitutional stakeholders.156 A serious,
democratically persuasive demonstration by Quebec of popular provincial unhappiness with confederation might be sufficient to invoke obligations on the part of
other constitutional stakeholders to meet Quebec at the bargaining table.157 However,
“Quebec could not purport to invoke a right of self-determination such as to dictate
the terms of a proposed secession to the other parties; that would not be negotiation
at all.”158 In short, Quebec may be culturally and linguistically distinct, but that distinctiveness entitles it to nothing except respectful attention; distinctiveness carries
with it no entitlement to authority, power, or status, either within the federation or
148
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Such talks followed the narrow defeat in 1995 of a Quebec referendum on secession. See 1 Peter W. Hogg,
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without it. If Quebec’s distinctiveness is to carry any consequences, the SCC ruled,
those consequences must be recognized in political negotiations carried out within
the existing framework for effecting constitutional change. Until then, any actions by
Quebec intended to precipitate secession would be unconstitutional.

2.6. Summary
Although the constitutional framework for allocating power differs in each of our
sample states, and the political contexts in which that power has actually been
exercised differ even more, the judicial analysis of subnational DIS claims displays
a remarkable consistency from one constitutional court to another. By way of summary, we offer some observations about the key features of the rulings just reviewed.
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

159

All the cases deal with legal formalization of DIS claims, either in a document of
subnational constitutional status or in a national law. Informal public beliefs
about distinctive local identity and autonomy may well go much further than the
formal legal claims made to courts in these cases, and indeed might well serve as
a source of lively and contentious disputation in the arenas of politics and public political discourse. Questions of distinctiveness and sovereignty, however, do
not get presented to constitutional courts until a threshold has been passed in
which the claims are asserted with a degree of formality sufficient to produce
legal consequences.
All the cases discussed here involve construction of the national constitution, and
find inconsistency between it and the DIS claim; that is, the national constitution is invoked as a firm limit on the permissible range of subnational autonomy
and independence.159 In several of the cases (Canada, Spain, Italy), the DIS claim
is viewed by the court as proposing or asserting an amendment to the national
constitution without the use of proper, formal procedures of amendment and is
inconsistent with the national constitution for that reason as well.
The courts in our sample do not generally distinguish between the secession context and mere internal jockeying for relative advantage within the state. Thus,
DIS claims made for purposes of internal positioning within the federation (Italy,
Spain, and in the unitary case, France) are received just as negatively as those
deployed to support actual or threatened secession (US, Canada).
The courts make no distinction between DIS claims made solely and unilaterally
by subnational units (Canada, US, Italy), and negotiated deals where the national
executive and legislative branches have agreed to recognize the DIS claim as
legitimate to some extent, such as through the enactment of a national statute
embodying a bilaterally negotiated settlement (France, Spain).
The courts uniformly decline to exercise judicial restraint or to invoke available
tools of judicial flexibility. For example, a court might treat the outcome of overtly
The decisions thus seem to confirm a hypothesis advanced by Jacob Levy to the effect that one benefit
of federalism is that it permits internal variation, but only within a certain range collectively deemed
acceptable. Jacob Levy, “States of the Same Nature”: Bounded Variation in Subfederal Constitutionalism, in
New Frontiers of State Constitutional Law 25 (James A. Gardner & Jim Rossi, eds. 2011).
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political negotiations between the central state and its component units as presenting non-justiciable political questions beyond judicial competence. Or a court
might treat decisions of subnational governments concerning the scope of their
own authority as entitled presumptively to some degree of judicial deference,
particularly where that judgment receives the endorsement of the national legislature and executive. Or again, a court might treat constitutional rules concerning the status of subnational units or the allocation of national and subnational
competencies as ambiguous, requiring courts to uphold any interpretation of
intergovernmental relations by other actors that is plausible and reasonable. In
the decisions collected here, however, constitutional courts uniformly decline to
invoke such tactics. Instead, their rulings tend to be harsh and categorical. Such
rulings do not open doors, but decisively slam them shut.160
Finally, judicial treatment of DIS claims in the four federal states (Spain, Italy,
Canada, US) is no more generous, tolerant, or accommodating than it is in the
unitary state in our sample (France). This suggests that the presence of a formally
federal or quasi-federal structure does not mitigate judicial hostility to formal DIS
claims.

3. The unique institutional role of constitutional courts
It remains, then, to explain two closely related questions raised by the rulings presented in the previous section. First, why do national constitutional courts display
such consistent and unremitting hostility to DIS claims across such a wide range of
circumstances? Second, why are national constitutional courts so much more hostile to DIS claims than other organs of national government such as the legislature
and the executive? As shown above, non-judicial organs of national governments are
sometimes willing to negotiate, to accommodate, and even to help implement subnationally asserted DIS claims at the national level. Courts are not.
We believe that the best explanation lies in the unique institutional position of
national constitutional courts, and in the practices shaped by and incentives offered
within that institutional position. We explore four possible arguments in support of
this contention. First, consistent with conventional understandings of judicial review,
constitutional courts may for institutional reasons be more likely to understand their
role as enforcing the constitutional bargain than as putting them under an obligation
160

It has been suggested to us by commentators from the western side of the Pond that this kind of rigidity
is precisely what ought to be expected from courts in civil law states, and indeed that such rigidity is an
integral aspect of the civil law method. Although we do not wish to deny stylistic and methodological
differences between civil law and common law adjudication, we think the point greatly overstated. For
example, as Anna Gamper points out, in Austria—the home of Kelsen himself—the constitutional court
employs in federalism cases a “consistency principle” according to which the constitutionality of a federal
or Land law is, in doubtful cases, presumed to be consistent with the federal constitution. See Anna Gamper,
Constitutional Courts, Constitutional Interpretation, and Subnational Constitutionalism, 6(2) Perspectives on
Federalism 24 (2014). She goes on to argue that the Spanish Constitutional Court also makes use of such
presumptions, allowing it a similar kind of flexibility rather than rigidity of results. Id. at 9.
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to make the constitutional bargain work in practice. Second, because constitutional
courts tend not to be repeat players in intergovernmental conflicts, they may lack
incentives to display greater tolerance of DIS claims intended by subnational units as
moves in a long-term process of intergovernmental contestation.
Third, as organs of the national government, constitutional courts may have incentives to favor the exercise of power at the national level. They may also see national
legislative and executive efforts to interpret or to seek accommodation within the
constitutional structure as intruding on their own exclusive power of constitutional
interpretation, and thus have incentives to assert their own power over conflicting
assertions of national executive and legislative power. Finally, national constitutional
courts may believe themselves to have a special role in the protection of national minorities, especially those that in a federation are weak on account of being geographically
dispersed. Because it may exclude many constitutional stakeholders, informal bilateral negotiations between national and subnational officials may be looked upon by
national constitutional courts with suspicion, causing courts to insist upon the use of
formal—and more inclusive—processes of constitutional amendment.

3.1. Courts as constitutional enforcers
Certainly the most obvious—but, we believe, ultimately unilluminating—explanation of why constitutional courts might behave differently from other national government officials looks to the distinctive nature and function of judicial review in
modern constitutional systems.161 That is, the main difference between constitutional
courts and other governmental actors arises from the distinct methods by which each
is charged to serve the public good. On this view,162 executive and legislative officials
may be conceived as actors whose raison d’être is to use the tools of legitimate government power to promote the welfare of the citizenry as directly as possible—to adopt
good laws and policies and then implement them through the exercise of public power.
To ensure that the efforts of these actors are confined to measures that will in fact promote the general welfare, however—to protect, that is, against well-intentioned but
dangerously overreaching uses of public power—constitutions impose constraints on
the available scope and methods of executive and legislative power.163
Courts, in contrast, may be understood differently. Although as constitutionally
created institutions they too are designed to serve the public good, their principal
161
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See, generally, Allan R. Brewer-Carías, Judicial Review in Comparative Law (1989) (analyzing judicial review
as fundamentally concerned with enforcement of the constitution as law).
It makes no difference, on this account, whether a constitution is conceived, in the fashion of the
Enlightenment, as a genuinely organic act of popular self-definition, see, e.g., U.S. Const., Preamble (“We
the People”), or, in the fashion of political scientists, as a merely instrumental “constitutional bargain”
among actors who wish to establish an efficacious vehicle for combining their efforts to enhance their
welfare. See, e.g., Edward Schneier, Crafting Constitutional Democracies: The Politics of Institutional Design
217 (2006). Although the reasons for judicial review differ in each model, in each the function of judicial
review is the same: to enforce the terms of the constitutional arrangement, however defined.
E.g., Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and
Outcomes 196 (1994) (“constitutions are first and above all, instruments of government which limit,
restrain and allow for the control of the exercise of political power”).
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method is not to pursue it directly through the adoption of beneficial measures and
policies, but to do so indirectly by faithfully enforcing constraints that the constitution
happens to apply to other actors in the system.164 Courts do not, in other words, need
to think about what measures would promote the general good, nor should they.165
Rather, they are required by their institutional role to presume that enforcement of
constitutional constraints in and of itself serves the public good.
Although this view of the matter is not without force, it does not in the end explain
the rather strikingly rigid formalism exhibited by constitutional courts engaged in judicial review of subnational DIS claims.166 The fact that courts have functional obligations to engage in judicial review says nothing about the way in which judicial review
is properly practiced. Judicial review may be strict or loose, independent or deferential,
risk-taking or risk-averse, and so forth, and the particular approach to judicial review
that a court adopts necessarily reflects a choice among the available approaches.167 In
the cases in our sample, however, courts adopted an approach to judicial review that
was for the most part strict, risk-averse, and undeferential toward the choices made
by other constitutional actors. With perhaps the notable exception of the Canadian
decision, the rulings rest mainly on relatively rigid and uncompromising definitions
of subnational roles, distinctiveness, and autonomy, and largely reject flexible readings of constitutional language establishing the status of subnational units in the
constitutional framework. The concept of “a people,” for example, is not read flexibly
to include the possibility that a national people might without contradiction include
a component subnational people, but categorically to exclude such a possibility. The
concept of subnational sovereignty is interpreted not to be capable of coexisting with
national sovereignty in a complex system of decentralized authority, but as by definition incompatible with it. In short, the fact that constitutional courts, unlike other
governmental actors, engage in judicial review does not go very far to explain the outcomes and reasoning of the decisions.

3.2. Lack of repeat play
Another possible explanation concerns the different perspectives that judicial and
non-judicial officials might bring to the phenomenon of national-subnational disputes. As indicated earlier, one commonly accepted and very plausible view of federalism is that it institutionalizes a system of permanent intergovernmental contestation.
In this system, national and subnational governments compete for popular allegiance
not only by using their powers to advance the public good through direct, independent
action, but also by using their powers to block or impede bad or contrary exercises of
164
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The great exemplar of this approach is probably Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
In the United States, the democratically illegitimate substitution of judicial for legislative judgment is
known pejoratively as “Lochnerism,” after Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), a case in which the
US Supreme Court invalidated a law setting maximum hours for bakery workers on the ground that is
was, essentially, unwise.
The charge of formalism has been made explicitly by some critics of the various rulings. See, e.g., Palermo,
supra note 16, at 247; Chessa, supra note 118; Mangia, supra note 118.
Edward McWhinney, Judicial Review 212–216 (4th ed. 1969).
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power by the other level. As a result, national and subnational governments engage
in what might be considered an ongoing game of positioning, claiming, acting, and
blocking for the purpose of advancing their policy goals as a means of competing for
public approval and advancing the public good.168
Because this game is primarily a game of action, it necessarily involves mainly the
executive and legislative branches at each level.169 It is these branches, rather than the
judiciary, that have the institutional capacity and authority to generate and deploy
public policies. As a result, executive and legislative officials at both levels are accustomed to competing with one another. These are the officials who actually take the
actions of which intergovernmental competition consists—they are the ones who formulate and implement policies, make claims and counterclaims about the allocation
of governmental authority, monitor and criticize actions of officials at the other level,
and develop strategies to obstruct bad policy decisions taken by their counterparts.170
A relationship of long-term competition is nonetheless a long-term relationship,
and people who are bound to one another over the long term, and who then encounter
each other repeatedly in similar circumstances, inevitably develop a kind of working
relationship based on mutual knowledge, expectations, and understandings.171 As a
result, the day-in and day-out complications associated with long-term competition
may not bother them. On the contrary, they may come to expect it, and because the
behavior of their opponents often becomes predictable, it may lose its capacity to surprise, much less to alarm.
For legislative and executive actors, then, a subnational government’s assertion
of a DIS claim need not be experienced as anxiety-producing. Instead, such claims
may logically be understood as deployment of just another tool in the ongoing process
of jockeying for advantageous position within the federation. Those who engage in
permanent contestation must expect reverses and exchanges of power and fortune.
Acceptance of a DIS claim need not precipitate the disintegration of the federation, for
any advantage accruing to the subnational unit today may be overturned tomorrow
by some different strategy. If the claim is denied today, the subnational unit may make
up the lost ground tomorrow by different means. Thus, although national legislative
and executive officials may be predisposed to resist DIS claims so as not to surrender
ground, their status as repeat players who firmly expect to engage in additional rounds
in the future may inoculate them against feeling that such claims mark any particularly great threat to the system over the long term.
National courts, on the other hand, are in a different position. They are not typically
involved in routine or ongoing contestation with subnational officials. Ordinarily, they
are not in a position even to observe regular competition occurring between subnational governments and their colleagues in the national legislative and executive
branches. Instead, national constitutional courts become aware of and involved in
168
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Gardner, supra note 7, ch. 2; Bednar, supra note 13, passim.
Gardner, supra note 7, at 87–99, 181.
Id.; Nugent, supra note 14, passim.
Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc’y
Rev. 95 (1974); Roger B. Myerson, Game Theory 309 (1991).
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intergovernmental competition only when a case reaches them, and even then their
involvement usually is confined to adjudicating that single case.
National courts in federal systems, then, tend to be, in the language of game theory,
single-shot rather than repeat players.172 This experience, in turn, may give them a
short-term rather than a long-term perspective concerning the significance of various
strategies of contestation deployed by the different levels of government. In particular, their role may predispose them to construe DIS claims more literally, and consequently to treat them as more serious threats to the long-term survival of the state,
than their counterparts in the national executive and legislative branches. Courts, in
other words, may honestly fear such claims. That fear could thus help account for the
hostility to DIS claims observed in the judicial opinions reviewed in Section 2, and the
rigidity with which the courts construe constitutional provisions dealing with subnational identity and autonomy.

3.3. Lack of impartiality
A third possible explanation for judicial hostility to subnational DIS claims might be a
lack of impartiality on the part of national constitutional courts toward the outcome
of conflicts between national and subnational claims to power. This could manifest
itself in either a general preference for the exercise of power at the national level or a
more specific preference for the exercise of national judicial power over the exercise of
power by other governmental actors at any level.
Since the middle of the twentieth century, government power at all levels has
expanded considerably, largely due to an expansion of common understandings of
the scope of the public sector as compared to the private sector.173 However, the expansion of government power at the national and subnational levels has not been symmetrical: “the experience of most federations,” Cheryl Saunders observes, “suggests
that central power is likely to expand, at the expense of the powers of the regions.”174
Why this pattern has emerged is not entirely clear. One possibility is that solutions to
various crises occurring during the twentieth century (a worldwide economic depression, two world wars, a global cold war, etc.) have required the exercise of substantial amounts of power at the national level,175 and power once assumed by national
governments is not then easily dislodged. Indeed, expansion of the scope of federal
172
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Cheryl Saunders, Constitutional Arrangements of Federal Systems, 25 Publius 61, 71 (1995). See also Mikhail
Filippov & Alga Shvetsova, Federalism, Democracy, and Democratization, in Federal Dynamics: Continuity,
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power may hold great appeal to federal officials because it gives them greater leverage
to deliver goods that help them get reelected.176
This kind of reasoning does not of course apply directly to judges of national
constitutional courts, who typically lack the capacity to generate “deliverables.”
Nevertheless, nothing rules out the possibility that such judges might prefer, when
faced with equally plausible choices, to direct powers to other national actors with
whom they are allied politically or to whom they owe their appointments rather than
to award such powers to subnational political actors to whom they have no strong
ties. With the exception of the Supreme Court of Canada, which by law must include
at least three judges from Quebec,177 none of the constitutional courts examined
here is constructed in a way that might encourage judicial responsiveness to subnational interests. To the contrary, judicial appointees are likely to be individuals favored
by national political actors, from whose ranks the appointees may well be drawn.
Nothing in such an arrangement by any means guarantees that constitutional court
judges will be more responsive to national than subnational interests,178 but nothing
discourages such an outcome either.
Another way in which constitutional courts might come to prefer the exercise of
national over subnational power arises from the nature of the power struggles in
which national courts may from time to time participate. National constitutional
courts, as discussed above, do not typically have any reason to engage in contestation with subnational governments. On the other hand, they may very well engage in
power struggles with other actors in the national government, and in particular with
actors in the national legislative and executive branches.179 This may in turn cause a
national court to react with hostility to deals negotiated between national and subnational governments if the court perceives such deals as encroaching on its own
power—in particular, the court’s exclusive power to interpret the national constitution, its only power of any great consequence.
176
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Adrian Vermeule, The System of the Constitution 125–127 (2011).
Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26. This minimal statutory requirement is supplemented by a
strong historical convention of appointing three judges from Ontario and two from the Western provinces and one from the Atlantic provinces so as to achieve balanced provincial representation on the
court. The chief justiceship traditionally rotates between an Anglophone and a Francophone. See Hogg,
supra note 148, at 243.
The great counterexample is surely the UK Privy Council, which over the course of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries essentially inverted the design of the Canadian Constitution to convert it
from one meant to create a highly centralized state into one that creates the world’s most decentralized
federation. Hogg, supra note 148, at 125–126; Peter H. Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Be
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of mutual struggle that keeps private liberty safe from excessive concentration of government power. See
The Federalist, Nos. 47, 48, 51 (Madison). As Madison famously put the principle, “[a]mbition must be
made to counteract ambition.” Id., No. 51.
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A court might take such a view if it comes to suspect that negotiations between
national and subnational governments concerning the identity, status, or autonomy
of subnational units amount to collusive attempts to amend the national constitution by informal and unauthorized means.180 In that case, permitting the national
legislative and executive branches to engage in negotiations that informally alter the
structure or meaning of the constitution may appear to the court to amount to acquiescence in a usurpation by those branches of power that properly belongs uniquely to
the constitutional court in its capacity as the sole and final interpreter and enforcer of
constitutional meaning. Thus, national constitutional courts may resist subnational
DIS claims not because they are afraid of ceding national power to subnational governments, but because they are afraid of ceding national judicial power to the national
executive and legislative branches. In these instances, subnational units wishing to
assert DIS claims—even those claims that might otherwise seem plausible or generate sympathy—may be caught up as innocent pawns in a completely unrelated
power struggle waged on the national level between constitutional courts and other
branches of the national government.

3.4. Protection of national minorities
A final possible explanation for the different reception of DIS claims by courts and
national legislative and executive actors focuses on the special role that national constitutional courts may play in the protection of minorities. Several of the decisions,
it will be recalled, treat DIS claims, whether made unilaterally by subnational units
or bilaterally with the approval of the national government, as attempts to amend
the national constitution outside of the formal processes provided in the constitution
itself. By rejecting DIS claims on this basis, constitutional courts insist that all amendments to the constitution proceed exclusively according to constitutionally approved
methods. We have already examined this response as a kind of judicial turf protection,
but there is another, more benign possibility: courts may insist on the use of formal
amendment procedures in their role as protectors of national minorities.181
This may seem paradoxical. A subnational population claiming a distinctive identity or additional autonomy rights is a national minority; to reject its DIS claims is
thus not to protect the interests of a minority but to participate in crushing its most
deeply held aspirations.182 Yet that view may be too simple. Nations contain many
minorities of different kinds. In a federal state, every subnational population is by
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definition a political minority. Moreover, not all minorities are geographically compact, and thus able to wield governmental power in virtue of controlling a regional
government. Many minorities are geographically dispersed, and in a federal state
are thus much weaker than those whose compactness allows them to control a
government.183
The most common reason why governmental actors might be tempted to resort to
informal methods of constitutional change is the difficulty of proceeding by formal
methods.184 Yet formal constitutional change tends to be difficult for a good reason: it
is the method that offers the most comprehensive and uniform protection for the interests of all stakeholders in the constitutional order.185 The insistence by constitutional
courts that constitutional amendments altering the status and autonomy of subnational governments proceed solely by way of formal mechanisms may thus reflect the
courts’ view of themselves as having a significant role in protecting the interests of
those excluded from informal workarounds and negotiations, especially other minorities unrepresented in informal (and sometimes bilateral) negotiations.186
This reasoning appears most clearly in the decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada. In holding that multilateral negotiations must precede any attempt by Quebec
to secede, the court explained that “[n]egotiations would be necessary to address the
interests of the federal government, of Quebec and the other provinces, and other participants, as well as the rights of all Canadians both within and outside Quebec.”187
“After 131 years of Confederation,” the court continued, “economic, political and
social institutions” are deeply entangled and secession would confront many of these
interests with “potential dismemberment.” “There are linguistic and cultural minorities, including aboriginal peoples, unevenly distributed across the country who look
to the Constitution of Canada for the protection of their rights.”188 A negotiated secession must, the court said, aim for “an agreement reconciling all relevant rights and
obligations.”189 If other national constitutional courts tend to share the view that one
of their important functions is to protect the interests of constitutional stakeholders,
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and especially of weak minorities, they may well have a special reason to dislike signs
of bilateralism in what they conceive to be a diverse and multilateral federal state.190
At the same time, however, this is precisely where questions can arise about the suitability of the constitutional court to play that role effectively. First, there is a potential question, alluded to earlier, about the composition of the court: the members of
the court might not be chosen in a way that makes them representative of, or even
responsive to, an appropriately wide variety of interests. Second, there is a problem
of judicial choice: which minorities get the benefit of the court’s protection, and why?
Should the court look with solicitude on the interests of the complaining subnational population? Or should the court feel a greater obligation to minorities scattered
throughout the national population? Which minorities, in other words, should be privileged by the court, and why? A principled basis may not always be readily available for
choosing one set of interests over another when those interests come into conflict.

4. Conclusion
We have argued here that subnational claims to a distinctive identity or sovereignty
(DIS claims) are often received with some degree of tolerance by national legislative
and executive actors, but are uniformly received with great hostility when asserted in
national constitutional courts. In exploring possible institutional explanations for this
disparate treatment, we are inclined to reject the view that judicial hostility is rooted
simply in the nature and function of judicial review in modern constitutional systems.
Three other explanations, we believe, hold greater promise.
First, the isolation of courts from the kind of intergovernmental contestation that
occurs routinely in federal systems may predispose courts to react to DIS claims with
greater alarm and anxiety than executive and legislative actors, who deal with subnational obstreperousness all the time. Second, the institutional position and composition of national courts may make them either insensitive to subnational claims or
much more sensitive to perceived encroachments on judicial power by other branches
of the national government, and this in turn might cause them to reject DIS claims
not on their merits, but as a strategy of horizontal contestation for power within the
national government. Finally, national constitutional courts might see themselves
as having a special role in the protection of constitutional stakeholders, especially
national minorities, and this might predispose them to prefer that DIS claims be made
exclusively in the context of formal processes of constitutional amendment, in which
all constitutional stakeholders are likely to enjoy maximum protection.
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